Exhibit A

Case 1:14-cv-10104-VEC Document 217-1 Filed 11/15/17 Page 2 of 24

HARJPHOC Coni	erence
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK	
PHOENIX LIGHT SF LIMITED, in its own right, et al.,	Λ
Plaintiffs,	
V.	14 Civ. 10104 VEC
THE BANK OF NEW YORK MELLON CORPORATION, et al.,	
Defendants.	
	October 20, 2017
	10:08 a.m.
Before:	
HON. VALEF	RIE E. CAPRONI,
	District Judge
	, and the second

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(In open court)

(Case called)

THE COURT: It is so good to see you all again. have a pending motion for reconsideration, right?

> MR. FITZGERALD: Yes.

THE COURT: Your motion for reconsideration is denied.

You have not identified any controlling authority or data that I overlooked. I understand you disagree with me. The 17th floor may agree with you and disagree with me, but you're going to have to wait on that.

MR. SCHATZ: Thank you, your Honor.

THE COURT: In your joint letter the parties raised questions. My incredibly detailed opinion was apparently not clear to you guys, so in response to your Question 1 B 4 which would be pre-event default based on a failure -- breach of contract, pre-event of default, based on failure to provide notice of representation and warranty breaches as to those four trusts, the defendant's position is correct. The claim is limited to the loans that were identified.

That is also the question to Question 1 B 5, relative to breach of contract based on failure to enforce repurchase obligations as to four trusts, the same four trusts. Again the defendant is correct, the claim is limited to the identified loans.

MR. SCHATZ: Would you entertain a question about

that?

THE COURT: Sure.

MR. SCHATZ: For two of those -- I understand it for the ones, where only one loan was identified -- for two of those letters, which is irrespective of hedge funds that look at a huge sample of loans from larger ones and identified a breach trade of 50 percent in one of the trusts and 66 percent in the other, and said there are problems that are trust-wide, systematic problems. For those two trusts, it would seem to me that if they were on notice, they were on notice of a duty to inquire, further based upon that representation to them.

So to limit the claims as to just the identified loans seems an artificial limitation, I would submit, particularly based upon rulings by your fellow judges, and I understand you're all independent and you all --

THE COURT: Thank Goodness.

MR. SCHATZ: Yeah, right. Last night I saw the president of the BNY M commission as well as yours. It was explained to me once. For those two pools of loans, it seems to me they were on notice and had a duty to inquire under Pauley's, Judge Pauley's ruling and also under Judge Failla's ruling and I think under the actual language of the trusts.

THE COURT: The language of the trusts requires an identification of breaches, right?

MR. SCHATZ: Yes.

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They identified specific loans that were THE COURT: in breach.

MR. SCHATZ: Yes, but the identification carried with it a suggestion and actually a statement if they look forward, they would find more.

THE COURT: It said that specifically?

MR. SCHATZ: That I would have to look at the exhibits. I do have them here.

THE COURT: That is okay.

MR. HOUPT: Just briefly, the contract says that the trustee shall have no duty to conduct any investigation. is somewhere in Section 802. The notice obligation under 203 is tied to the repurchase obligation which is loan-specific. The court found we might have discovered loan specific breaches. If you look, you might find others. That is on specific discovery.

MR. SCHATZ: The other point I would make is that since your Honor ruled, Judge Wesley in the Second Circuit ruled that, noted that the RMBS industry in the run-up to crisis was a race to the bottom with inside parties trying to downwardly define their obligations and duties.

THE COURT: That was despicable, but the fact remains that the contract is the contract.

MR. SCHATZ: Yes, but the contract actually -- yes, yes, and no. The court's ruling which I understand the court

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is adhering to was based on an expressly onerous argument in one provision, it says actual knowledge and notice and the other provides it says notice only; and, therefore, the court and I think correctly used the canon, said therefore, the parties meant to exclude actual knowledge.

But the race to the bottom thing, I think the way these contracts were drafted, they're boilerplate contracts that --

THE COURT: Sort of. They're all different in their own little ways.

MR. SHATZ: They are different and the reason they're different it is like a game of telephone. The contracts are being dumbed-down in the closing and you'll see differences between numerical tranches, OA 11 and 10, you'll see differences between them.

They don't make any sense. They have been carried across all the other contracts, and so there is ambiguities inherent in all these contracts as a result of self-interested parties downwardly defining their duties.

THE COURT: And people buying the loans didn't do due diligence and accepted all that.

MR. SCHATZ: What did they do? They made recomendations under --

THE COURT: This is a jury argument.

MR. SCHATZ: I understand.

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THE COURT: I get your point. I am dealing with the contracts at this point, and the contract is the contract.

MR. SCHATZ: Yes, I understand.

There are other rules of contract construction I think that bear here. One is contra-proffer -- the certificate holders are the parties for whom these contracts are written. Throughout these contracts it says for the benefit of the certificate shoulders, but the certificate holders had no say in how these contracts were written. These parties had every say in how these contracts were written. For that reason, they ought to be interpreted against them. If there is any ambiguity at all, it should create a jury argument.

I want to go back to this particular point. The court is saying that for these two loans, that -- two trusts, that despite being on notice of a substantial systematic problem, a written notice from a respected financial player, that there was systematic problem throughout the trust, that only the ones that were specifically identified are actionable, where we have this recent ruling, again I will not play judge politics, but just say the issue is can a party fail to get knowledge by closing its eyes and going nah, nah, nah, nah, I don't see. That is the issue that is being raised by these two notices.

They got a notice that showed a systematic problem, and they did nothing. I think that --

THE COURT: I think they sent it on to the --

All the other parties to the contract. 1 MR. HOUPT: 2 THE COURT: And no one did anything. 3 The seller apparently didn't agree with MR. HOUPT: 4 those allegations and they didn't repurchase the loans. 5 MR. SCHATZ: Again there is no enforcement mechanism 6 built into these contracts. They were created in a way that 7 creates illusion of protection for certificate holders, but 8 provides none. 9 THE COURT: I heard you. No. It is loan-by-loan. 10 I don't quite understand the problem you've run into 11 in the issue of re-underwriting and I have problems with both 12 of your positions. Let's start with the plaintiff. Why can't 13 the plaintiff identify now or the proposal is by November 15 14 the reasons that you want to re-underwrite? 15 MR. SCHATZ: We have, in fact, identified --THE COURT: Why can't you be bound by a list that will 16 17 be produced by November 15th? 18 MR. SCHATZ: For one reason. Mr. Fitzgerald can help me with this issue because he is more intimately involved. 19 20 believe it requires the input of our expert. 21 THE COURT: This case was filed when I was a brand new 22 I am now old and cranky. Why haven't your experts 23 looked at these already? 24 MR. SCHATZ: They have been looking at them.

THE COURT: Mr. Fitzgerald, why can't you be bound by

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the list by November 15th?

MR. FITZGERALD: The main concern, we would like an opportunity to address the court's ruling with respect to these particular notices. We would like to collect a few more of these loan finals that were the subject of the notice and look at them.

THE COURT: How long is that going to take?

MR. FITZGERALD: Probably take a few months.

THE COURT: Why?

MR. FITZGERALD: It takes -- we can --

THE COURT: You have got all this stuff.

MR. FITZGERALD: We are relying on a third party to turn them over. First we need to seek your permission to go and ask the seller for the loan file. Then they need to go and get them. I am estimating that will be a 30-day process.

THE COURT: I am sorry. The identified loans that are in the letter you have had for two years if not more. I don't understand. Are you serious that you don't have all these loan files yet?

MR. FITZGERALD: Well, the seller would not produce all of them. Understandably, there would have been hundreds of thousands, so we had --

THE COURT: There wasn't hundreds of thousands on the list, was there?

MR. HOUPT: Not in the letters.

MR. FITZGERALD: We have everything on the list.

We would like the opportunity to request a few more loan files to address this aspect of the court's ruling. Discovery has been closed for a while so we haven't been able to do this. It wouldn't take that long to get them, but particularly if the seller agreed to do so quickly, but we are at their mercy to some extent, and they will have to identify the loans in their possession.

We tried to mitigate the burden on them by requesting — it was a few thousand. I don't have the number right in front of me, but there are a few more that we would like to request and to get it to address this aspect of the court's ruling.

THE COURT: Are you going to re-underwrite those?

MR. FITZGERALD: Yes, if we can get them.

THE COURT: You still haven't answered my question why you can't be bound by a list that you can create by November 15th?

MR. FITZGERALD: By November 15th?

THE COURT: Correct.

MR. FITZGERALD: By early December would be more realistic.

THE COURT: Why is it going to take a month and a half?

MR. FITZGERALD: Because we will have a bit of

1 back-and-forth as to what we can get.

THE COURT: You can do it by December 1?

MR. FITZGERALD: I think we can commit to that.

THE COURT: Okay. Assuming the plaintiff identifies the loans that are going to be re-underwritten by December the 1st, why is an extended deadline for expert rebuttal re-underwriting and damage reports necessary?

MR. HOUPT: So we have done this a few times already including with plaintiff's firm. In the case we just finished in Ohio, their expert testified he took 22 months to re-underwrite 3100 loans. We did not have a very reasonable rebuttal schedule, and we are -- our expert had to hire extra staff and work 18 hours a day, and he managed to get it done in five months.

This case is a little more complicated because whereas that one had one originator, this one has 15 originators, and they told us they think it will take 9 months to go through the volume of loans that plaintiffs proposed. As you just were discussing, we can start that process if we at least get the identities of the loans, we can start arranging those files and matching them up with applicable underwriting guidelines, can do that before we get the report and that will cut some time off the schedule.

The other reason we proposed --

THE COURT: Hang on a second. Being generous, that

1 | would take you to September the 1st of next year.

MR. HOUPT: Well --

THE COURT: Because you're going to -- they'll identify the loans by December 1. You say it will take 9 months to underwrite, and I am assuming there is a month for frumping around.

MR. HOUPT: We can start if we have the sample, but we don't have the report, and our experts tell us they can spent four to eight weeks productively in that span, but we need to get their report to see what breaches they're alleging, and that is when the actual re-underwriting will take place.

THE COURT: Okay. Does that sound reasonable?

MR. FITZGERALD: It seems a little bit protracted. There is going to be much fewer loans than in the case that counsel referenced.

THE COURT: How many loans are there going to be?

MR. FITZGERALD: We estimate right now about 1500 at the most.

THE COURT: How many were there in how?

MR. HOUPT: Exactly the number. In that case they reviewed 3100. They alleged breaches on half of them and that is what we had to do. We just did response on ones they alleged breaches.

THE COURT: It is the same amount.

MR. FITZGERALD: We reviewed 3,000 in that case. He

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is saying they just reviewed the breaching ones. I don't know what the defect rates are.

THE COURT: Your theory is you will review 1500. Assuming there is 50 percent default rate, they will only have to look at 750.

MR. HOUPT: If we knew in advance what the breach rate would be, we could propose a shorter schedule. In some of these cases plaintiffs allege 99 percent breach rates.

MR. SCHATZ: It IS quite --

MR. FITZGERALD: I do think the number of loans will be much lower that they need to review, but we can't tell you exactly what they will be.

THE COURT: Let's come back to that and talk about the trust that BNYM did not know what they were doing on; that is, they didn't know they were the master servicer or at least their lawyers didn't know. That is FNLC 2005-1. Why does it not make sense for you all to agree to sever that trust and put it on its own schedule?

MR. SCHATZ: Well, we think that it requires -- that would result in two cases. It would be an increase --

THE COURT: That is true.

MR. SCHATZ: -- in work on the court. We think it can be fit into the current schedule without any real harm to The discovery will be guite limited and focused. issues, the same parties --

THE COURT: But it is a different obligation.

MR. SCHATZ: It is. One issue that they raised was prejudice, but that can be dealt with jury instructions. The court certainly can deal with that.

THE COURT: I am not sure I would try them together because they're so different.

MR. SCHATZ: Are they?

The issue, the fundamental issue is the failure to abide by the standards in the contracts. That is an understandable issue. The thing is there will be extra discovery in this case anyway related to the collateral managers, and so we were thinking we would just fold in our discovery which is going to be -- we just need the servicing files which they have not given us and then we would target, have targeted search terms to run and a couple of depositions. Their proposition is to have bifurcated -- not just bifurcated discovery, but bifurcated motion practice.

THE COURT: I am not inclined to do that. Given I am not inclined to do that, does it make sense, does it nevertheless make sense to sever that trust out?

MR. ANCONE: We think it does make sense. As you pointed out, it is a separate case, separate witnesses and discovery.

THE COURT: Is it a separate group in the bank?

MR. ANCONE: It is there. There is a firewall between

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corporate trust, which was the group that dealt with all the trusts at issue and summary judgment breaching, and the master servicing group deals with this particular trust.

THE COURT: You're not going to agree to severance? MR. SCHATZ: I don't think it is a necessary expense for you and us.

THE COURT: Thank you so much for looking after my schedule.

MR. SCHATZ: I do care.

THE COURT: I appreciate that. Your motion to sever is due on November 15. Your response is due November 29th. Do you want more time than that because that is over Thanksgiving?

MR. SCHATZ: I think that would be prudent.

THE COURT: Your response is due December the 4th. Any reply is due December 11th. It looks like you need additional discovery for third parties?

MR. SCHATZ: Limited. Again Ms. Glazer can handle that.

THE COURT: Is this fact discovery on -- not on this trust, not on 2005-1. On the other trusts, the ones for whom fact discovery is closed or for which?

MS. GLAZER: If your Honor is referencing Point 1 in the additional matters?

THE COURT: Yes.

MS. GLAZER: So that is what Mr. Fitzgerald is

speaking about previously. We would just request your permission to seek a small number of additional loan files to the extent we don't already have them from third parties during this time period.

MR. SCHATZ: That was based on the court's ruling, the need for them?

MS. GLAZER: Yes.

MR. FITZGERALD: One other thing, we wanted to confirm with Bank of New York Mellon there is not any additional evidence suggesting the document exceptions were cured that relates to the Regae B related contract claim. We were just concerned documents were produced during the summary judgment briefing. We wanted to avoid any big surprises going forward.

If they can confirm if there was any evidence of cures of document exceptions, they produced that already. We wouldn't need discovery discovery on that point, but we would like additional discovery if they can't confirm that.

THE COURT: Can you confirm that?

MR. HOUPT: I need to check what we produced, but there were additional exception reports that were created. Either we have them or we will produce them. If what Mr. Fitzgerald means by that is to know whether the delivery exception has been cured as of today, we have to look in the warehouse today and see what is there. They never asked for that.

MR. FITZGERALD: Your Honor, what I am referring to is 1 what I think Mr. Houpt referred to. There are these things 2 3 called trailing exception reports, and they produced a number 4 of them. THE COURT: Trailing exception reports? 5 MR. FITZGERALD: Yes. That is what we refer to them 6 7 Sometimes they're saved as that. We have not seen those for all trusts, so if they exist, we would like them. 8 9 THE COURT: Did you request them before? 10 MR. FITZGERALD: Sure. 11 MR. SCHATZ: It is just a matter we don't want to get 12 sandbagged. 13 THE COURT: I am sympathetic. What about the loan 14 files, is there any objection to them serving third-party 15 discovery to get these additional loan files? No. We don't have those documents. 16 MR. HOUPT: 17 THE COURT: I understand that. 18 MR. HOUPT: They're welcome to serve. THE COURT: You can do that, but you've got to get it 19 20 done because your deadline is December 1st to have a list of 21 the loans you're going to re-underwrite. 22 Then you refer to something -- what is the issue with 23 the depositions of the collateral managers? 24 MR. SCHATZ: No issue. It is a non-issue.

THE COURT: Perfect. Non-issue, it is a non-issue.

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Do I care?

MR. SCHATZ: No. You can help us maybe.

THE COURT: Oh.

MR. SCHATZ: The court issued an order. We agreed to produce the depositions, but we didn't represent the deponents, and they had third-party counsel, and we thought as a matter of prudence we should obtain their consent because they're marked, "Confidential." I think we produced 5 of the 11 that exist. So there are six more. If the court orders us to produce them notwithstanding any confidentiality designations, we can do it tomorrow.

THE COURT: I ordered you to produce them a whole long time ago. What happened?

MS. GLAZER: Your Honor, when you had ordered us to produce them last July, there were no deposition transcripts of collateral managers. There were a few depositions taken in our actions of collateral managers this year. Discovery was stayed, and at the time that you had ordered us to produce them, we didn't know whether we would represent the collateral managers or not.

We didn't end up representing any of them, so what we had told Bank of New York Mellon's counsel is that we would like, we think we are required to seek the permission of the third-party counsel before producing the transcripts and we have been working to do so.

1	THE COURT: Do that quickly, please.	
2	MR. ANCONE: If I may, your Honor.	
3	You're right, the order came down last year and I	
4	understand at that point there were no transcripts available.	
5	We have been meeting and conferring. If I could, I think maybe	
6	having a date certain	
7	THE COURT: I am about to set one. They should be	
8	produced by November 15th. If any lawyer won't consent, let me	
9	know.	
10	MR. SCHATZ: Okay.	
11	MS. GLAZER: Thank you.	
12	THE COURT: That brings us to the schedule.	
13	So your schedules were actually for the most part one	
14	day apart. That led me to believe why you bothered fighting	
15	over a single day.	
16	MR. ANCONE: We didn't fight over that. It is just a	
17	convenience issue, not having deadlines on Friday or Monday.	
18	THE COURT: Okay. So you're moving Monday deadlines	
19	to Tuesday?	
20	MR. ANCONE: Things like that, right.	
21	THE COURT: Or Friday to Thursday? Exactly, moving	
22	them back?	
23	MR. ANCONE: Exactly.	
24	THE COURT: That seems like a nice thing for	
25	associates. So the real dispute, I am going to go with the	

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associate-friendly schedule of no Fridays or Mondays. So that takes us to this issue of the rebuttal underwriting reports, correct?

> MR. HOUPT: I think that is right.

THE COURT: You've pushed it all the way out to January 2019.

MR. HOUPT: We have proposed that their report would be due at the end of April, and then we would have I think that is nine months after that to serve.

THE COURT: That just seems excessive.

MR. HOUPT: It is certainly longer than expert discovery in most cases I have been involved in, but what the expert has to do here is go through thousands of files, each of which contains dozens of documents, and come up with a single -- it is time consuming. We will crack the whip, but that is what our experts told us we needed.

THE COURT: Maybe they need an extra expert. I will give you until the end of September. So September 28th for your rebuttal expert report.

MR. SCHATZ: Your Honor, our proposal didn't have this bifurcated expert discovery, and they've got two kinds of expert discovery. One is the -- why is that?

THE COURT: This is limited entirely to the loan re-underwriting.

MR. FITZGERALD: Yes.

THE COURT: That is all it is. Your April 26 deadline 1 is the deadline for all expert reports other than 2 3 re-underwriting reports, okay, which they can't do until they 4 get your report. Does that solve your problem, your objection? 5 MR. SCHATZ: They still have a summary judgment motion 6 before they do any of their underwriting. Our schedule --7 THE COURT: No. If their deadline is September 28th, the deadline for summary judgment is November 1. 8 9 MR. SCHATZ: I see you've moved the date up, okay. 10 THE COURT: Does that solve your problem? Your 11 schedule -- (multiple voices) --12 MR. SCHATZ: You're the judge. I thought our schedule 13 was more concrete. 14 THE COURT: It is more compact, but it doesn't deal 15 with their problem, which is they can't really do their underwriting report until they see what you're beefing about. 16 17 So your deadline is September 28th. Then there will be a 18 rebuttal to that, right? How long do you need for that? You asked for a month. 19 20 MR. SCHATZ: Is that adequate? 21 MR. FITZGERALD: 45 days. 22 THE COURT: You asked for less than a month. 23 MR. FITZGERALD: Fine. 24 MR. SCHATZ: But they got longer. I want to make sure

we don't end up getting the short end of the schedule.

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THE COURT: I am confident that you will not. So their report is due September 28th. Then yours will be due October 26th. That is going to squeeze you on summary judgment.

MR. HOUPT: Maybe everyone else understands but me. I thought what we agreed on was there would be one set of reports by whichever party has the burden of proof on that issue and that will be served in April.

MR. FITZGERALD: Yes.

 $$\operatorname{MR.}$ HOUPT: Then there will be one rebuttal report by whichever party --

THE COURT: Is rebutting.

MR. HOUPT: This seems to contemplate they do re-underwriting, we do a response, and they do another re-underwriting report.

THE COURT: What is the February 21 deadline in your schedule?

MR. HOUPT: That was our effort because we knew the re-underwriting was taking a long time. We would serve the re-underwriting report as soon as possible, but then the damages report -- and this will be true on both sides -- the damages expert needs to know what, at least what the breach rate is and possibly what specific loans the re-underwriting expert found in breach.

Rather than setting a deadline all the way up when the

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damages expert would be done, we serve the re-underwriting report as soon as it is ready and start with depositions, and then the damages expert would have another three or four weeks to finish that work. If they wanted to do that on their end as well, that would be fine. They would serve everything, their damages report would come later because that would depend on other reports.

THE COURT: Is that agreeable? Work together. Send me a schedule to be so ordered, okay?

That is everything I've got, I think. Are the parties interested in talking settlement?

MR. SCHATZ: My view is it is never a problem to talk settlement, but we did broach the subject together, and I believe it is not something --

THE COURT: Not close enough yet?

MR. HOUPT: No.

MR. SCHATZ: We are not, no, we're not.

THE COURT: Okay. So be it.

MR. HOUPT: One other question. We didn't put this in the letter, but you may know some of the other judges have wanted preliminary briefing and rulings on whether sampling is appropriate. We don't really care what the order is, but if you want to do that sooner, we could set a schedule for that.

THE COURT: Are you going to be doing sampling?

MR. FITZGERALD: We may in a few trusts. We haven't

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decided finally yet.

THE COURT: I will tell you what. If that is where you land, that you're going to do sampling, how about sending me a letter to that effect, and that will tee up the issue for discussion at that point.

MR. FITZGERALD: Just notifying you that we will --THE COURT: Just notifying that is what you would like to do.

MR. FITZGERALD: Not briefing it?

THE COURT: Not briefing it and I'll set up a briefing schedule. What I want to do, if you are going to do sampling, talk to your opponent, explain what your sampling methodology is so they can make an intelligent decision to object.

MR. FITZGERALD: Sampling in the context of loan file re-underwriting?

THE COURT: Right. Is there any other sampling you're planning to do?

MR. FITZGERALD: Not sitting here today, but we may.

THE COURT: If it changes, stay in touch.

MR. FITZGERALD: We may.

THE COURT: Anything further?

MR. HOUPT: No.

MR. SCHATZ: No.

THE COURT: Have a nice weekend.

(Court adjourned)